Abstract. We suppose that the reason for the obvious hardness of the so-called hard problem of consciousness lies in two implicit assumptions characteristic of western thinking. The assumption of the fundamental existence of the object and the assumption of the fundamental existence of the self cannot both be valid, if something like a psychophysical link is taken for granted. Other than monistic approaches that are incompatible with one of the two assumptions, we strictly reject both assumptions. Spacetime holism, which in the first place is a view of the material world, can be extended by an assumption on the nature of consciousness, thus providing the basis for a non-reductive solution to the hard problem of consciousness.
INTRODUCTION
David Chalmers (3) proposes a distinction between what he calls the easy and the hard problems of consciousness. While the easy problems concern possible scientific explanations of the structure and function of cognitive processes, the hard problem addresses the relation between conscious experience and the material world as it is described by natural science: Why are (some) physical processes accompanied by conscious experience?
In our view, Chalmers fully succeeds in showing that there cannot be a reductive explanation of this hard problem, i.e. the very fact of subjective experience cannot be explained on the basis of our structural and functional descriptions of the physical universe. However, this does not exclude the possibility of a non-reductive explanation. If we take consciousness to be fundamental, and if we can formulate a set of assumptions on the nature of conscious experience, which can consistently be related to our physical models, we may claim to have arrived at a satisfying scientific explanation of consciousness.
In this article, we will suggest a solution of this non-reductive kind which, however, significantly differs from Chalmers' approach. 1 Our starting point is a critique of two assumptions characteristic of western thinking: the fundamental existence of the object (AFEO), and the fundamental existence of the self (AFES). Rejecting AFEO leads us to the formulation of a holistic world view called spacetime holism. 2 The rejection also of AFES creates the possibility for an assumption on the nature of consciousness and a testable law relating scientific ("third-person") descriptions to phenomenological ("first-person") descriptions, quite in the sense of Chalmer's psychophysical principles.
OBJECT, SELF AND PSYCHOPHYSICAL LINK
To make it clear from the beginning, we are suggesting a view of both mind and matter that radically differs from what is usually taken for granted in western thinking. For every such fundamental undertaking, it is good and necessary to criticize the ruling paradigms. This very often includes the danger of burning straw puppets, especially when no clear and generally accepted view of the domain exists, which is truly the case in both the philosophy of mind and the "philosophy of matter."
The following formulation of two assumptions (one on "matter" and one on "mind") is not meant to describe the common starting point for reasoning about consciousness, nor do we claim that these assumptions have never been questioned (in fact, every monistic approach to the mind-body problem is incompatible with one of them). What we are trying to say is that only a radical and rigorous rejection of both assumptions allows an integrated view of mind and matter.
The Assumption of the Fundamental Existence of the Object (AFEO)
In the classical, Newtonian picture of the material world, the universe is seen as a collection of particles interacting with each other, thereby obeying deterministic laws. The critique of this view usually concentrates on determinism -according to the Kopenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, a kind of ontological nondeterminism rules the behavior of matter.
There is, however, a second idea standing behind the classical worldview, which is much less questioned, namely the idea that matter comes in pieces (particles) that can be separated from each other (at least analytically), that exist objectively, and that can be defined to an arbitrary degree of precision, at least in principle. 3 Such a world would, indeed, be best described by a hierarchy of "right" models of different levels of abstraction (physics, chemistry, biology,…), where each but the fundamental level could be reduced to a lower level.
The concept of spacetime holism, which will be introduced in section 3, explicitly rejects this picture and all of the listed properties of matter.
The Assumption of the Fundamental Existence of the Self (AFES)
In the western philosophical tradition, as well as in folk psychology, the conscious self is understood as a closed entity, strictly separated from other selves. While the self may take a whole lot of different states, and while these states are influenced from the outside, the self, in its core existence, remains unchanged. Typical statements illustrating AFES are: "I try to discover my true self", "It is impossible to look into another person's self."
We are fully aware that rejecting AFES may face even more resistance than the rejection of AFEO. It is easy to see how essential the fundamental self is for "ourselves" (e.g. as the source of free will) and for any social system (responsibility for our actions).
However, we think it is mostly due to this "natural" assumption that there are so many unsolved philosophical problems centering around the relation between mind and matter.
When formulating an alternative, it should be stressed that rejecting AFES does not at all imply that conscious experience is taken as an illusion. 4 The eastern philosophical tradition provides a concept of an ultimate form of consciousness, called empty consciousness, which is void of any content and void of any self. This concept of consciousness underlies what we will call the fundamental "to be"-quality in section 5.
As a conclusion to this paragraph, let us try to answer the two above statements that were used to illustrate AFES. Self-discovery, i.e. the search for a "true" self, should be replaced by a notion like self-creation, i.e. the creation of more or less stable borders and differences to the outside world and the maintenance of peaceful relations with our own past and future. 5 In a traditional understanding it is not possible to look into another person's self, but we would like to insist that it is very well possible to create a common consciousness (a common "self") with another person (empathy, love,…), thus breaking the assumed closure of the individual self.
The Psychophysical Link
Both AFEO and AFES can be quite successfully criticized in their respective domains. However, the problems they cause are illustrated best when yet another "obvious" assumption is added, namely the assumption that there is a link between the worlds of mind and of matter. The following statements and questions underline the problematic relation between AFEO and AFES.
• The same conscious subject exists on changing matter.
• The same piece of matter can in principle take part in different conscious selves (at least sequentially).
• In the frustrating situation caused by the incompatibility of AFEO and AFES, it is our strategy to weaken the status of both the self and the object, such that a reasonable psychophysical relation becomes possible.
SPACETIME HOLISM
In this section we briefly summarize the main principles of spacetime holism, 6 which in the first place is an approach to the world of matter.
Inside versus Outside Observation
Before getting into the details of spacetime holism, we have to introduce a conceptual distinction between two types of observation respectively two types of description.
By outside view we mean the ideal of natural science, namely the construction of a God-like perspective of the world, where observation is no longer a physical, interactive process. From the outside, we see things "as they are". However, all our observations are inside operations, as we ourselves are part of the physical universe, and each observation, in the last consequence, is an interaction between an observer and the thing observed.
As a first example, think of a simple length measurement of an object by the use of a meter stick. The statement "this object is one meter long" says something about the object, the meter stick and the measurement procedure, and is therefore the result of an inside observation (using a "meter" stick that is twice as long would yield half a meter as a result of the length measurement). Of course, by normalizing measuring instruments and by defining measurement procedures we can construct a perfectly useful outside perspective, which allows us to treat the result of a measurement as an objective property of the measured object. This is much less clear in the second example: It is hard to think of a statement like "this person is nice" as an outside observer's statement capturing an objective property of a person.
The distinction between inside and outside observation is just a tool for further investigation and does not imply any philosophical position (realism or subjectivism). It also should be stressed that inside observation has nothing to do with consciousness in the first place. However, it should be clear that conscious observers are inside observers.
Ontology
To a certain degree, spacetime holism is in good accordance with David Bohm's concept of "undivided wholeness" (2) . What is usually regarded as physical objects existing independently of each other is understood as necessarily imperfect patterns that an observer cuts out of an irreducible and infinitely complex whole. If at all it is useful to talk of ontology, only the whole deserves an ontological status. Any attempt to describe the world as a collection of interacting parts (that exist as such) is therefore doomed to failure. 7 Once the impossibility of a complete and consistent ontological order of the world is accepted, there is a pragmatic way of dealing with ontology. If we do not demand that the entities of our most different models and descriptions (from physics to sociology) can be fully defined and reduced one to the other, we can work (or better: go on working) with a virtually infinite ontology. In this heterogeneous picture there is no priority given to some entities or some perspective.
Beside the incompleteness of any description, there is yet another limitation to scientific knowledge of the material world for spacetime holism, namely the impossibility to achieve a perfect outside view. As inside observers, we can only construct more or less consistent outside views.
The Universe as one Spacetime Whole
The idea that space and time form some kind of unity is part of the (standard) interpretation of the theory of relativity. However, there is no common treatment of space and time in other disciplines. The reason for this lies mostly in the big difference between our every-day perceptions of space and of time (time "flows", 8 space does not), but may also have something to do with the way relativity theory is understood. 9 Though agreeing with known holistic approaches in their treatment of entities and relations in space, we would like to criticize holism for its treatment of the time dimension. Most holistic approaches are far away from integrating space and time. 10 Instead, time is seen as something special, and different concepts are used for the description of relations in time (e.g. Bohm's "flowing movement", non-determinism in quantum theory, unpredictable emergence in the theory of selforganization). In our approach, we go one step further by fully integrating the time dimension: Everything in spacetime must be regarded as one indivisible whole. As a consequence, the same conceptual tools can be applied to both space and time.
Infinite Complexity and Self-Containment
To assume the fundamental incompleteness of any description of the whole in terms of perfectly definable parts is tantamount to assuming that the spacetime whole is infinitely complex. This allows us to postulate an additional feature of the whole without running into contradiction, namely full containment of the structure of the whole in each "part". 11 This, of course, does not imply that the structure of the whole can be studied equally well in each part.
SPACETIME STRUCTURE AND THE DUALITY RELATION
The assumption of infinite complexity of the spacetime whole does not mean that no understanding or description of the structure of spacetime is possible. For our investigation, we suggest a terminology that, on the one hand, allows relations to concepts in mathematics, physics, and systems theory. 12 On the other hand the terminology is soft enough to be applicable to a wide range of less precise domains, e.g. to psychology and sociology.
Continuity and Discontinuity
We talk about continuity along one dimension of a description when several entities differing in position along that dimension have something in common. While continuity forms the basis for the recognition of relations between entities, discontinuity may lead us to make distinctions and to draw borders, it is thus a precondition for the concept of an object.
Levels of Description
The necessity for a distinction between levels of description can be illustrated using the distinction between continuity and discontinuity. What appears as a discontinuity on a lower level of description may be described as a continuous sequence of discontinuities on a more abstracted level. An object can be seen as a discontinuity in spaceyet there can be a continuous arrangement of objects in space. An event can be seen as a discontinuity in time -yet there can be a continuous sequence of events.
Non-locality and Locality
The distinction between non-locality and locality is an abstraction of the distinction between continuity and discontinuity. The ideal object has a location in space and is unaffected by its environment. Beside its spatial discontinuity the object is extended in time. Its existence in time is thus not bound to a short interval like it is the case for its spatial existence. In this sense we call objects non-local in time. When reversing space and time we come 9 The standard interpretation of relativity theory does not provide an intuitive interface -not even to the physicist -for more general theorizing about space and time. In (13, 14) we have suggested a simpler and more intuitive interpretation of relativity theory. The Minkowski geometry of the standard interpretation, which treats space and time in a still different way, can be replaced by a fully Euclidean geometry that lacks any apriori difference between space and time dimensions. Applying our distinction between inside and outside views, the Minkowski geometry turns out to be an inside geometry, while the fully Euclidean geometry represents an outside view. 10 Though usually not seen as a "holistic" theory, general relativity can be regarded as a prominent exception. 11 Compare to David Bohm's notion of "implicate order" (2) . More on self-containment follows in section 5.4. 12 Especially, we think it is fruitful to link our terminology to different concepts of complexity, c.f. (1). across phenomena that are non-local in space, but local in time. The ideal wave 13 is identical for all (spatial) points. On the time axis there is discontinuity: The behavior of a (spatial) point in a wave is not primarily correlated with prior or later states of that point, but much more to other spatial points (at the same time). Like the objects marks a point in space, the wave marks a point in time.
The Duality Relation
As a generalization of the last paragraph, we assume a very general linkage between structural properties along space and time dimensions:
Continuity (non-locality) along one dimension is correlated with discontinuity (locality) along the other dimension.
Only when discontinuity concentrates on the spatial axes, a description as an object is justified. In the same way it is the discontinuity along the time axis that characterizes the wave. For us, both sides of the duality are necessarily incomplete -in general, there is continuity and discontinuity on all levels in space and time. In the following, we will talk about a duality between particle and wave aspects that correspond with the pairs (discontinuity in space, continuity in time) and (continuity in space, discontinuity in time).
The classical scientific world view exemplified by Laplace´s demon appears as the belief in the sufficiency of the particle aspect: If a demon knew the positions and velocities of all particles of the universe at some point in time, he could calculate every state of the universe at any time! From this viewpoint time is a purely continuous dimensionthere should be a "right" level of description that makes the passage of time a transformation that neither brings anything new nor looses anything.
SPACETIME STRUCTURE AND THE THEORY OF SELF-ORGANIZATION
The theory of self-organization deals with features of the material world that -if taken seriously -are incompatible with the traditional scientific worldview (i.e. with AFEO). While this problem keeps being mentioned again and again, there are no attempts being made to formulate an alternative world view. Instead, concepts like emergence seem to be simply added as extra ingredients responsible for those aspects of matter that cannot be explained on reductionist grounds.
In the following, we shortly discuss the main features of the theory of self-organization from the perspective of spacetime holism.
Part-Whole Relation
A critical feature of self-organizing systems is the mutual dependency between the level of the parts and the level of the whole (e.g. two way causation; 14 "the whole is produced by the parts -the parts are enslaved by the whole", (7)). As long as we believe that one level (usually the level of the parts) has a fundamental existence in the sense of AFEO, an influence from the other level is logically impossible. However, when we accept that what we call the level of the parts is just a useful, yet in principle incomplete description, the contradiction disappears. The whole can be given an equally incomplete, but as well useful status, and it does make practical sense to study the relation between the two levels.
An even more mysterious relation between part and whole, namely mutual containment, has already been mentioned in section 3.4. In fact, an infinitely complex whole does allow full containment in its parts without any contradiction. The best and most obvious example are fractal structures, but we would also like to point to an interesting property of dynamical systems, which also holds for chaotic dynamics (which produce infinitely complex behavior). According to Takens' theorem of embedding (10) it is possible to reconstruct the attractor of a dynamical system by analyzing the time series of a single variable or observable. This can be read as full containment of the dynamical structure, which is a product of the whole system, in the time evolution of each part. 15 13 The metaphorical use of the term "wave" requires some clarification. What we have in mind is a standing wave rather than a propagating one. Associations with quantum theory are intended -the so-called collapse of the wave function shows the postulated properties of spatial nonlocality (a simultaneous link between distant parts) and temporal locality (non-predictability, at least from local parameters). 14 For a discussion of the issue of upward versus downward causation, see (5) . 15 This kind of part-whole relation in dynamical systems is the key argument for our approach to the representation problem in cognitive science (12) ; more on this in section 7.
Emergence
Emergence is, indeed, the magic word in the theory of self-organization. In its weak meaning, however, it simply addresses the fact that the interaction of fully describable parts may produce some collective patterns that are interesting or unexpected for an observer. In the strong meaning of the term emergence, the collective behavior is supposed to exert some causal influence upon the behavior of the parts. The viewpoint of spacetime holism in this question has just been given in the preceding paragraph: There are no fully describable parts and no fully describable wholes, therefore there is no contradiction.
When talking about emergence in a paper on consciousness, a statement on the relation of consciousness and emergence should not be left out. We think it is clear from Chalmers' argumentation that emergence only addresses the structure and function of material objects and processes. Therefore the very fact of conscious experience can in no way be explained as an emergent property of matter.
System
The notion of a system is both central and hard to define, not only in the theory of self-organization. From the perspective of spacetime holism, all that can be done is to describe certain aspects (and their relations), which are relevant for treating something as a system.
• External particle aspect. A system shows some independence from its environment and some stability.
• External wave aspect.
A system is open to the environment, it interacts and thus takes part in multiple meta-systems (hierarchical or overlapping 16 ). By this, it is possibly subject to changes.
• Internal particle aspect. A system has some internal structure, which can be described as constituent parts in interaction.
• Internal wave aspect. A system maintains relations between its parts. ("The whole is more than the sum of its parts"). These aspects compete with each other and cannot be fully present at the same time The more some aspect dominates, the less we are inclined to talk of a self-organizing system.
SOLVING THE HARD PROBLEM
After introducing spacetime holism and after showing the applicability of its concepts to systems theory, we are now in the position to formulate our assumption on the nature of consciousness and its link to our descriptions of matter. Before doing so, we would like to stress that what we called the wave aspect is not per se an account of consciousness. The simultaneity connection between spatially distant parts (e.g. quantum entanglement, or the integration of distributed information in the brain (e.g. by means of oscillations, Crick and Koch 1990)) are surely important functional properties of conscious beings -function, however, cannot explain experience.
The "To Be"-Quality of the Whole
Spacetime holism grants a fundamental, ontological status to nothing else than to the spacetime whole. When taking the existence of consciousness serious, and when believing in a relation between the material world and the world of conscious experience, there is only one reasonable option for a basic assumption on consciousness: There must be something like a fundamental experiental aspect of the spacetime whole. In order to express that this aspect does not have the properties standing behind the usual understanding of the term consciousness, this aspect is given the name "to be"-quality. A related notion is empty being or filled nothing.
17 Attempts to describe the "to be"-quality consist mainly of negative statements -most importantly, this elementary form of experience neither has a self nor an object, and it is even free of space and time concepts.
18 As a more positive description, the feeling of unity and of being home might be associated.
Quite analogously to the assumption of structural self-containment of the whole, the "to be"-quality is present everywhere in spacetime. By assuming an omnipresent form of consciousness, spacetime holism seems to be very close to panpsychism (or panexperientalism). The crucial difference is that for panpsychism everything is conscious, 19 while in a fundamental sense only the whole is conscious for spacetime holism. Although the "to be"-quality is present anywhere in the spacetime whole, there are no well-defined parts that are conscious as such in the first place. For panpsychism, there is a difficult problem how the consciousness of one part mixes with the consciousness of another part to form a higher, common consciousness. 20 In spacetime holism this problem does not exist, at least in this form, -the question is rather why the spacetime whole appears to come in well-defined parts, both material and mental.
Compatibility of Descriptions ("Psychophysical Law")
On the one hand, spacetime holism provides a conceptual framework for an alternative description of the material world from an outside perspective. The basic notions have already been described: continuity versus discontinuity, non-locality versus locality, and the duality relation for spacetime structure.
On the other hand, there are introspective approaches describing different qualities of experience. Beside the assumption of the "to be"-quality of the whole, the assumption that both sets of descriptions, the external and the introspective, can be made compatible, creates a perspective for a scientific investigation of consciousness.
Identification
As the bridge between external description and conscious experience, a correlation between continuity (from a third-person perspective) and what is experienced as identity from the first-person perspective is assumed. Following from the structural properties postulated by spacetime holism and the assumption of compatible descriptions, there has to be a duality relation also for self experience.
The first side of this duality, the spatial self, depends on borders (discontinuities in space) and determinism (continuity in time). In this state we, as inside observers, are identical through time, as time is the continuous dimension. We loose this experienced quality when our borders are destroyed, or when the subjective, local causality of the chain of events breaks down (e.g. when we are shocked). The spatial self has a location in space, it makes a distinction between me and the world.
The second side of the duality, the temporal self makes a distinction between experiences and therefore between points in time. The temporal self is located in time. By giving up the spatial closure, i.e. by interacting, we get integrated with the world. The experienced quality of this kind of self is the feeling of identity with the world, as in this case space is the continuous dimension.
The two sides of the duality have to be regarded as just two aspects of self experience that usually do not take their extremes, and therefore do not exclude each other. While normal states of self-experience can be regarded as specific mixtures of both aspects (on different levels), the pure form of consciousness, which has been termed the "to be"-quality, can be re-introduced as full identification in space and time.
So far, the concept of representation addressed relations in space. However, in a very similar way we can talk of memory as the representation of entities in time. Both forms of representation are central for a full-blown self attached with a high level consciousness (i.e. what is usually called consciousness). By representing, we create ourselves and the world by making a distinction, but at the same time we establish relations -the represented object is not me, but I know how to deal with it; the memory is not now, but it relates to what is now.
Representational processes can both be studied from a third-person perspective and from a first-person perspective. From the third-person perspective, we analyze their structure and function, from the first-person perspective, we experience different states of consciousness and different qualia.
As long as we understand that structural and functional descriptions can never be complete, we can cautiously use them to reason about the levels and states of consciousness attached to some investigated system or entity. As an extreme example, consider a rock, whose structural and functional analysis does not provide any reason for believing that it represents its environment or its history. We therefore conclude that it is not conscious in the usual understanding. This, however, does not contradict our general assumption of the omnipresence of the "to be"-quality. More interesting examples are different kinds of animals, whose more or less present cognitive and social abilities may lead us to draw conclusions e.g. about the qualities of pain they can experience.
This link between structure and function on the one hand and consciousness on the other hand must not be mistaken with the belief that the performance of a function is sufficient for the presence of consciousness. 22 The simultaneously present, different aspects of a system capable of representation require infinite complexity and selfcontainment. Therefore artificial (information processing) systems performing a definable, finite function can in principle not be conscious. The philosopher's pet in the consciousness debate, the zombie, is a hypothetical functional equivalent to a human being that lacks consciousness. From our viewpoint, this construction simply does not work: There can only be functional equivalence to a human being, if the zombie has the same status as an infinitely complex and inseparable sub-structure of the whole. If so, it will have a full-blown consciousness as well.
